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 Introduction 
The United States Constitution includes a guarantee that the government will not become 
involved with one’s ability to freely practice religion.  The framers included within this document 
a Free Exercise Clause and an Establishment Clause.1  The Free Exercise Clause protects “a 
church’s right to decide matters of governance and internal organization,” while the Establishment 
Clause forbids “excessive government entanglement with religion.”2  These clauses, known 
together as the Religion Clauses, provide churches with a high degree of autonomy from 
government interference.  This includes its decisions regarding who shall serve as its leaders, now 
known as the “ministerial exception.”  Although this exception always existed, the United States 
Supreme Court did not recognize it formally until its 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC.3  This case solidified the doctrine, making religious 
employers immune to claims of employment discrimination by those who qualify as a minister.   
The Hosanna-Tabor decision solidified the existence of the exception, but still left many with 
questions regarding its scope, specifically who qualifies as a minister and thus is barred from 
bringing claims of employment discrimination.  Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Hosanna-
Tabor4 provided some guidance on who qualifies as a minister under the exception, but the Court 
did not announce a formal test.  Without adopting a formal test, the Court leaves who qualifies as 
a minister up to interpretation.  The Court should adopt a bright-line test which focuses on the 
intentions of the church and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the employee’s duties to 
 
1 U.S. Const. Amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or the free exercise 
thereof…”). 
2 Petruska v Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
3 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
4 Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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create a formal, easily applied test of who qualifies as a minister.  Additionally, this exception 
should apply to all claims, not just those claims rooted in discrimination law. 
When researching the ministerial exception, it became clear that much confusion exists 
between section 702 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ministerial exception.  
While these two doctrines set out similar protections for employees, there are differences in 
application and scope. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment based on an 
employee’s gender, sex, religion, race or national origin.  The religious exception, in Section 702 
of Title VII, protects employers from claims of religious discrimination when the claim relates to 
a religious corporation, association, or society with respect to the employment of 
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on 
by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities or to an 
educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform 
work connected with the educational activities of such institution.5   
 
This section thus allows religious employers to discriminatorily favor employees of their own 
religion.  Additionally, this protects religious employers from claims of religious discrimination 
when those claims stem from employment within a religious institution and the job pertains to said 
religious institution.6  This does not protect employers from any other claim of discrimination 
under Title VII, such as race, gender, national origin or color. 
The Religion Clauses protect the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion.  Cases 
that apply the ministerial exception bar the court’s interference with a decision made by religious 
institutions when those decisions pertain to the upper-level of church employees or ambassadors 
 
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Section 702; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1986) 
(holding that an employer is protected from claims of religious discrimination under Section 702). 
6 See Id.; See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Section 702(a). 
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because doing so would violate the church autonomy protections given by the First Amendment.7  
This includes all types of discriminatory behavior, including the race, color, religion, or national 
origin that Section 702 does not cover. This exception fills in the gaps left by Section 702 and 
provides protection to religious institutions that discriminate against their ministers for both 
religious and non-religious purposes.8 
Part II of this paper will explain the difference between the constitutionally based ministerial 
exception and the statutorily based exception under Section 702 of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.  Part III explains the pre-Hosanna-Tabor landscape and gives details regarding the 
most relevant cases prior to the 2012 decision.  Part IV explains the facts, holding and two 
concurrences of the Hosanna-Tabor case, giving us clarity on the scope of the ministerial 
exception for the first time and becoming the landmark case in this area.  Part V explains how the 
courts have applied the Hosanna-Tabor decision in discrimination cases since 2012.  Finally, Part 
VI explains the holes left by the Hosanna-Tabor decision, including possible solutions to the 
problems left in the wake of this case. 
I. Development/History of the Ministerial Exception 
a. Supreme Court Precedent: Development of the Church Autonomy Doctrine 
The Constitution always guaranteed Americans that the government would not become 
entangled with religion.9  This included that the government would not involve itself with a 
religious entity’s decision to hire or fire its employees.  Although the ministerial exception was 
 
7 Laura L. Coon, Note, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the 
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 481, 500 (2001). 
8 Id. 
9 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
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not formally recognized by the court until 2012,10 courts protected a church’s right to 
autonomously make decisions for at least one-hundred-forty years prior.11 
The First time the Court encountered a case that laid the foundation for the ministerial 
exception occurred in Watson v. Jones.12  This case and its holding serves as a basis for the more 
formal ministerial exception, which is not introduced until Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich in 1976.13  In Watson, “the Court considered a dispute between antislavery and 
proslavery factions over who controlled the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church.”14  
When the Presbyterian Church built the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, it decided to 
incorporate the trustees of the church with the power to hold any real estate then owned by the 
church.15  These trustees were to serve a two-year term before requiring re-election.16  The problem 
in this case stemmed from a dispute over who had power to choose whether or not the church 
would participate in slavery.17 
Ultimately, the Court held that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or 
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to 
which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as 
binding on them.”18  While this case did not involve a claim of employment discrimination, it 
serves as the first time the Court recognized that a decision made by the highest level of internal 
government of a church was not to be disturbed by civil government or legal system.  Additionally, 
the Court, for the first time, provided a scope of the Church Autonomy Doctrine, which laid the 
 
10 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
11 See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872). 
12 Id. 
13 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
14 Watson, 80 U.S. at 727 
15 Id. at 679. 
16 Id. 
17 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 679. 
18 See Id. at 727. 
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foundation for the ministerial exception.  The Court in Watson stated that for the Church Autonomy 
Doctrine to apply, there must be (1) a “question of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, 
custom, or law” and (2) that question was “decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories.”19  
Although this decision did not introduce the ministerial exception, these principles laid the 
foundation for the Court’s later decisions that created the exception. 
The Court next decided Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in 
North America.20  After the Bolshevist Revolution of 1917 in Russia, a separatist movement 
developed among members of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States.21  This 
movement eventually declared its autonomy from the mother church in Russia.22  As a way to free 
the church in the United States from those atheistic and subversive influences of the mother church, 
the New York Legislature passed a bill that required “all the churches formerly administratively 
subject to the mother church in Russia be governed by the ecclesiastical body of the American 
Separatist movement.”23   
This action began over a dispute as to who should control a building that was used as a 
church.24  The plaintiffs, a corporation that held the building in trust for the mother church in 
Russia, challenged the defendants, appointees of the central Russian church authorities (appointed 
by the American Separatist movement).25 
The Court ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs.26  After first explaining that Watson27 
was decided before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted that the Free 
 
19 Id. 
20 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
21 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 96. 
25 Id. at 96-97. 
26 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121. 
27 80 U.S. 679 (1872). 
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Exercise and Establishment Clauses are incorporated into and made applicable to the states in order 
to protect the people against acts of the state such as this bill.28  The Court also held that those who 
controlled the building classified as clergy of the church and that “freedom to select the clergy, 
where no improper methods of choice are proven,” falls under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.29  As such, the bill requiring all churches to be governed by the American Separatist 
movement was deemed unconstitutional.30 
These cases paved the way for the Court’s decision in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich,31 which directly involved the relationship between a church and its minister.  This 
case involved the split of the American-Canadian Serbian Orthodox Diocese after a bishop was 
defrocked for claims of misconduct.32  After finding out about the claims of misconduct, the 
mother church made the decision to defrock the bishop.33  The bishop then sued the mother church, 
requesting the Illinois State Courts to declare him the true diocesan bishop.34  The Illinois Supreme 
Court obliged and ordered him reinstated.35 
The United States Supreme Court found that deciding this dispute would violate the principles 
of the First Amendment.36  The Court introduced, for the first time, the ministerial exception, 
reinforcing Watson and Kedroff, stating “[T]he rule of action which should govern the civil courts 
. . . is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law 
have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, 
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application 
 
28 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115-16. 
29 Id. at 120-21. 
30 Id. 
31 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
32 Id. at 698-99. 
33 Id. at 705. 
34 Id. at 706-07. 
35 Id. at 708. 
36 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710. 
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to the case before them.”37  The Court leaned on the fact that the mother church was the one who 
made the ultimate decision about a high-ranking employee of the church in finding that it could 
not decide the dispute.38 
While the above cases all cemented the fact that a decision a religious institution makes 
regarding its highest level of employees, or clergy, or ministers should be binding and free from 
governmental review, none of these cases defined the protection afforded to these groups.  No test 
existed to decide if someone qualified as a clergy or minister, leading to the need for that 
clarification in Hosanna-Tabor. 
b. Lower Court Precedent 
The lower courts recognized a ministerial exception for at least forty years prior to 
Hosanna-Tabor.39  Beginning with the cases of McClure v. Salvation Army40 and Rayburn v. 
General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,41 the lower courts first used the term ministerial 
exception and clarified the scope of the exception. 
McClure involves a dispute between the church of the Salvation Army and one of its 
ordained ministers, Mrs. Billie B. McClure.42  After undergoing a two-year training period by the 
Salvation Army, Mrs. McClure was commissioned as an officer [minister] in June, 1967.43  After 
Mrs. McClure was terminated from her officer position, she brought suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging the Salvation Army engaged in discriminatory practices based 
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 711-12 (“Because the appointment [to the chaplaincy] is a canonical act, it is the function of the church 
authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses 
them.”). 
39 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
40 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
41 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
42 McClure, 460 F.2d at 554. 
43 Id. at 555. 
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on her gender, and that she was retaliated against for complaining of these practices to her 
superiors.44 
The Fifth Circuit found that being an officer constituted being a minister, and as such, the 
Free Exercise Clause barred the employment discrimination claim.45  “We find that the application 
of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship existing between The Salvation Army 
and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister, would result in an encroachment by the State into an 
area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause 
of the First Amendment.”46  The Court clarified, however, that “’if a serious doubt of 
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a 
construction of the statute [Title VII] is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’”47 
This decision shows the Court’s reluctance to decide this issue, as it will avoid deciding cases 
through the lens of Title VII if at all possible.  
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists presents the first time a court 
formally calls the exception the “ministerial exception,” but does not go far enough to cement this 
exception into law.48  The conflict in this case arises from a claim of racial and sex discrimination.49  
Appellant Carole Rayburn is a white member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church.50  After 
applying for a vacancy on the pastoral staff of the Sligo Seventh-day Adventist Church, she was 
denied.  Ms. Rayburn then filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
under Title VII alleging that she was not hired based on her sex, her association with black persons, 
 
44 Id. at 555-56. 
45 Id. at 560. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 1936, 297 U.S. 288 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Brandeis). 
48 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1165. 
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her membership in black-oriented religious organizations and in retaliation of her filing a 
complaint under Title VII.51  The federal district court dismissed the claim. 
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district 
court, holding that “because state scrutiny of the church’s choice would infringe substantially on 
the church’s free exercise of religion and would constitute impermissible government 
entanglement with church authority,” the Court could not rule on the issue.52   
While both of these cases solidified the existence of an exception, they lacked any guidance 
on how the courts should apply the exception.  Over the next forty years, every circuit adopted the 
ministerial exception and there were numerous cases that attempted to apply the confusing 
precedent surrounding the ministerial exception.53  The need for a distinct set of criteria led to the 
case of Hosanna-Tabor in 2012. 
II. The Ministerial Exception Accepted: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
& Sch. v. EEOC 
a. Facts 
This case stems from the decision of petitioner Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School to terminate the employment of Respondent Cheryl Perich.  Petitioner is a 
member of the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod.54  The school has two categories of teachers, 
“called” and “lay.”55  “Called” teachers are those who have been called to their position by God 
and require certain academic requirements, including a course of theological study.56  “Lay” 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
54 Id. at 171. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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teachers are not required to be trained by the Church.57  Once a teacher is “called,” they receive 
the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”58 
After respondent completed the required training, the school hired her as a “called” 
teacher.59  In addition to teaching secular subjects, Ms. Perich “taught a religion class, led her 
students in daily prayer and devotional exercises, and took her students to a weekly school-wide 
chapel service,” which she led about twice a year.60 
In 2004-2005, Ms. Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy.61  She notified the school of her 
condition in January 2005, stating that she would be able to return to work in February.62  The 
school informed her that they already contracted with a “lay” teacher to fill Ms. Perich’s position 
and expressed doubts about her ability to return to the classroom.63  After Ms. Perich was not hired, 
she threatened to assert her legal rights and sue the school for discrimination.64  After this, she was 
told that she must use the internal decision-making process to complain, and was fired due to her 
threat to sue.65 
After being terminated for “insubordination and disruptive behavior,” Ms. Perich filed a 
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that her termination 
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.66  The EEOC brought suit against the employers, 
which Ms. Perich intervened in, alleging that Ms. Perich was terminated after threatening to file 
an ADA law suit.67  Hosanna-Tabor invoked the “ministerial exception,” arguing that the First 
 
57 Id. 
58 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 171-72. 
65 Id. 
66 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 172. 
67 Id. 
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Amendment barred the suit because Ms. Perich was a minister.68  The District Court ruled in favor 
of the school, granting summary judgment in favor of Hosanna-Tabor.69  The Sixth Circuit vacated 
and remanded that decision, recognizing the existence of a ministerial exception but concluding 
that Ms. Perich did not qualify as a “minister” under the exception.70  Had the Court found that 
Ms. Perich did qualify as a minister, her suit could have proceeded on other grouns as she could 
have continued on disability grounds or on any other grounds where Title VII’s exemption for 
religious discrimination does not apply. 
b. Majority Opinion and Holding 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion in a 9-0 decision.  After delving into a history of 
the battle between church and state and how this history influenced the creation of the First 
Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts briefly summarized the case law up to this point.71  After giving 
a history of the Amendment and the creation of the doctrine of church autonomy, Chief Justice 
Roberts recognized that the ministerial exception does exist, including in the decision, for the first 
time, the name “ministerial exception.”72   
Chief Justice Roberts then explains the reasoning for the exception.  He writes that if the 
Court were to get involved in a church decision to accept or reject a minister, the Court would be 
interfering “with the internal governance of the Church.”73  This passage is similar to the earlier-
discussed cases of Watson, Kedroff and Serbian Orthodox in that it acknowledges the long history 
of the Court respecting the autonomy of a church.  The Court stated that  “[b]y imposing an 
 
68 Id. 
69 EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106726, 8 (E.D. MI 
2008). 
70 EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F. 3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010). 
71 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184-87 (summarizing the contents of Part III of this paper). 
72 Id. (“We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”). 
73 Id. at 188. 
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unwanted minister, the state infringed the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s 
right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”74 
The opinion then turns to the contentions of the parties.  To begin, both sides contended 
that employment discrimination laws would be unconstitutional if they infringed upon the right of 
association.75  As such, the EEOC and Ms. Perich saw no need for the existence of the ministerial 
exception.76  The EEOC and Ms. Perich acknowledged that the right of association granted in the 
First Amendment serves to protect religious institutions from claims of discrimination in certain 
circumstances, such as compelling an Orthodox Jewish seminary to ordain a woman.77  Since an 
established means of protecting these institutions from these types of claims of discrimination 
already exists, Petitioners argued that there is no need to create a brand new doctrine.   
The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the right of association is given to both 
religious and secular groups and that the Court could not accept a view that the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses do not speak to “a religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”78 
The Court then dismissed the argument that the decision in Smith79 precluded the 
recognition of a ministerial exception.  In that case, two members of the Native American Church 
were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a substance that was illegal under federal law.80  
The Supreme Court held that this did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because “the ‘right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral 
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
 
74 Id. 
75 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
80 Id. at 877. 
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religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”81  Chief Justice Roberts makes clear that a church’s selection 
of its ministers differs from ingesting peyote, as Hosanna-Tabor concerned government 
interference with the internal decisions of a religious institution that affect the faith and mission of 
that institution while Smith involved government regulation of an outward physical act.82 
After dismissing the respondent’s arguments, Chief Justice Roberts set out to define the 
scope of the exception, specifically who qualified as a minister.83  Chief Justice Roberts looked to 
factors such as Ms. Perich’s title of minister, her specialized theological education, the fact that 
Ms. Perich held herself out as a minister, and the scope of her job duties (“leading others toward 
Christian maturity and teaching faithfully the Word of God”).84  Using these factors directly 
opposed the Sixth Circuit’s determination that Ms. Perich was not a minister.  The Court held that 
the Sixth Circuit erred in leaning too heavily on the fact that Ms. Perich performed the same duties 
as lay teachers and the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on Ms. Perich’s performance of 
secular duties.85  Based on these factors, the Court held that Ms. Perich did qualify as a minister, 
and therefore, her claim of discrimination was barred.86  Although the Court looked to these factors 
in this case, it did not offer any concrete or bright-line test as to if an employee qualifies as a 
minister.  Chief Justice Roberts also turns to a totality of the circumstances test, explicitly 
restricting this holding to claims arising under anti-discrimination statutes, as opposed to other 
types of claims, like breach of contract.87 
 
 
 
81 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 877). 
82 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
83 Id. at 191. 
84 Id. at 191-92. 
85 Id. at 174. 
86 Id. at 192-94. 
87 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195-96. 
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c. Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion 
Although the Hosanna-Tabor case was a 9-0 decision, two Justices felt compelled to write 
a separate concurring opinion.  Justice Thomas authored the concurrence to clarify what he 
believed the constitution meant by having a ministerial exception.88 
Justice Thomas did not deliver a concrete test of who was a minister; however, he did 
propose a method of determining this.  In the concurrence, he writes “in my view, the Religion 
Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious 
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”89  Justice Thomas felt 
that the differing leadership structures present in the many religions the people of this nation 
practice presented problems when a secular court attempted to interpret who should qualify as a 
minister.90  Justice Thomas feared a “bright-line” test of who qualifies as a minister because he 
felt that this sort of test would disadvantage those groups whose beliefs fell outside the scope of 
the “mainstream” religions.91  Additionally, Justice Thomas feared that creating a concrete test 
would cause these religions to curtail their beliefs and leadership structures to ensure that their 
way of choosing ministers would conform with the test.92  At the conclusion of his concurrence, 
Justice Thomas wrote that while the Court thoroughly set out the facts that made Cheryl Perich a 
minister, the main reason for this qualification was that “Hosanna-Tabor sincerely considered 
Perich a minister.”93 
 
 
 
88 Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
89 Id. at 196. 
90 Id. at 197. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197. 
93 Id. at 197-98. 
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d. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion 
The second concurrence in this case was authored by Justice Alito, with whom Justice 
Kagan joined.94  Through this concurrence, Justice Alito attempts to outline the scope of the 
ministerial exception by proposing an informal test to determine if Perich was a minister. 
After discussing the history of the exception in both the Constitution and in lower courts’ 
case law, Justice Alito turns to the facts of the case.  He rests his decision that Perich was a minister 
on four main questions, which many have called the “religious functions test,” asking: 1) whether 
Perich played a substantial role in “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission;” 
2) how often Perich taught the children religion; 3) whether she led the students in daily devotional 
exercises and prayers; and 4) the frequency that she led church-wide worship services.95  While 
Justice Alito does not provide any specifics on how much time must be devoted to these activities, 
prong two, three and four all point to the intensity and frequency of the work.  Additionally, the 
substance of each prong involves conveying, teaching, transmitting or carrying out religious 
messages, missions, or ceremonial practices.  These four categories are the first time that the Court 
has introduced any sort of “bright-line” test.  However, he does not describe which factors, if any, 
are the most important.   
Justice Alito fails to describe the limits to which one’s duties could be considered to satisfy 
a prong.  For example, Justice Alito does not describe if leading worship services once a year 
satisfactorily satisfies the fourth prong.  Interestingly, Justice Alito ends his concurrence similar 
to the way Justice Thomas concluded, stating that what truly matters is that the religious entity 
considered Perich a minister.96 
 
94 Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring). 
95 Id. at 205. 
96 Id. at 206. 
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III. Application of the decision in Hosanna-Tabor 
Although only seven years have passed since the decision in Hosanna-Tabor, there are ample 
examples of the lower courts interpreting and applying the Supreme Court’s decision.  However, 
these courts seem to have differing opinions on how to apply the decision, although most courts 
emphasize similar parts of the Court’s decision when deciding whether one qualifies as a 
minister.97  While the decision of the Supreme Court seemed to focus on if the person in question 
was engaged in the ministry of the organization, the lower courts seem to focus more on the 
individual activities described in Justice Alito’s concurrence.98 
The first of these comes in the decision in Cannata v. Catholic Dioscese of Austin.99  In that 
case, Cannata became the Music Director at St. John Neumann Catholic Church.100  “In this 
position, Cannata oversaw the Music Department’s budget and expenditures, managed the sound 
systems at the church and maintained the sound equipment, music room, and music area in the 
sanctuary, and rehearsed with members of the choir and cantors and accompanied them on the 
piano during services while running the soundboard.”101  All of the liturgical responsibilities of 
Cannata’s predecessor were given to another employee because Cannata lacked the requisite 
education, training, and experience.102 
After Cannata was fired in August 2007, he brought suit against the church alleging that his 
termination was in violation of the ADEA and the ADA.103  The district court eventually granted 
 
97 Brian M. Murray, A Tale of Two Inquiries: The Ministerial Exception After Hosanna-Tabor, 68 SMU L. Rev. 
1123, 1123 (2015). 
98 Id. 
99 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the previous three-part test used by the Court to determine if one 
qualifies for the ministerial exception could no longer be used due to Hosanna-Tabor). 
100 Id. at 170 
101 Id. at 171. 
102 Id. 
103 Cannata, 700 F.3d at 171. 
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a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the application of the 
ministerial exception.104 
Prior to the Hosanna-Tabor decision, the Fifth Circuit applied a three-factor test for 
determining when an employee qualifies as a minister.105 
First, this court must consider whether employment decisions regarding the 
position at issue are made largely on religious criteria[.] . . . Second, to constitute a 
minister for purposes of the “ministerial exception,” the court must consider 
whether the plaintiff was qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the 
Church . . . Third, and probably most important, is whether [the employee] engaged 
in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious, including whether 
the plaintiff attends to the religious needs of the faithful.106 
 
     After consulting with a professor of Constitutional Law, the Fifth Circuit formally invalidated 
this three-part test, deferring to the totality of the circumstances articulated in Hosanna-Tabor.107  
The Court acknowledged that a “bright-line” test would better help the lower courts in their 
application of the Hosanna-Tabor decision, however, the clear rejection of a bright-line test in that 
decision shows that lower courts should look to the totality of the circumstances so as to not 
discriminate against any one religion.108  The Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal of 
Cannata’s case, holding that because music was a central part of the religious ceremonies of the 
church, and those musical performances were led by Cannata, that Cannata did qualify as a 
minister, barring his discrimination claims.109 
This decision becomes increasingly relevant as many religious educational institutions are 
moving to include language in their handbooks which specify that all teachers, regardless of the 
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subjects taught, qualify as ministers.  This trend began in 2015 when bishops in California, Hawaii 
and Ohio required all teachers to know and adhere to Catholic teaching.110  This move by the 
Church leadership is spurring controversy, as the teacher unions fear that by allowing the church 
to require this of teachers the church will gain too much power in collective bargaining.111  The 
church, on the other hand, defends the practice by explaining that these teachers are meant to be 
moral role-models for the students, intended “not only by word, but by example, . . . to be models 
to their students of ‘the ideal Person,’ Jesus Christ.”112 
In addition to the attempt by the archdioceses to take control over this issue, the Supreme 
Court has the opportunity to re-examine the issue.  Petitions for a writ of certiorari have been filed 
in the Supreme Court asking for a decision on whether a teacher with religious functions in a 
religiously grounded school can be a minister if they have no formal religious training or 
education.113  Two of these cases are from the Ninth Circuit and one is from the California Court 
of Appeals.114   
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, out of the Second Circuit, further exemplifies the 
views of Hosanna-Tabor, except in that case, the court formulates the totality of the circumstances 
view in a four-part test.115  In this case, Fratello served as principal of St. Anthony’s School, a 
Roman catholic educational institution.116  After her contract was not renewed by the school, 
Fratello sued alleging gender discrimination.117 
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The Second Circuit looked to Hosanna-Tabor for guidance after St. Anthony’s attempted 
to use the ministerial exception to bar the claim, leaning heavily on Justice Alito’s concurrence.  
The Court originally examined the claim using the four factors set out in the majority opinion of 
Hosanna: “1) the formal title given [to the teacher-plaintiff] by the Church, 2) the substance 
reflected in that title, 3) her own use of that title, and 4) the important religious functions she 
performed for the church.”118  The Second Circuit pointed to Justice Alito’s concurrence when it 
stated that “a formal title indicating that the plaintiff is playing a religious role, though often 
relevant, ‘is neither necessary nor sufficient.’”119  As such, the Second Circuit, again agreeing with 
Justice Alito, held that courts should focus primarily on the functions the employee performed.120  
The Court ultimately held that although Fratello’s title was not inherently religious, the facts 
presented made it clear that she held herself out as a spiritual leader and performed many important 
religious functions that advanced the Roman-Catholic mission of the school.121  As such, the Court 
affirmed the district court’s application of the ministerial exception and grant of a motion to 
dismiss.122 
Although much case law exists after the Hosanna-Tabor decision, there is no uniformity 
among the lower courts.  Different circuits adopt different tests, stressing different duties in their 
determination of who qualifies as a minister.  This confusion of which test to adopt is evident in 
Biel v. St. James School.123  In this case, Biel, a fifth-grade teacher, was fired after taking time off 
due to a breast cancer diagnosis.  The Ninth Circuit applied the factors from Hosanna-Tabor and 
held that Ms. Biel’s claim was not barred by the ministerial exception.124  The Ninth Circuit 
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reached this decision because (1) Biel’s bachelor degree was not of a religious nature, (2) her 
position came with no religious requirements, such as teaching a religion class, (3) the school did 
not hold her out as a minister, and (4) her job was not analogous to that of Ms. Perich in Hosanna-
Tabor.125  The Court found that due to these factors, Ms. Biel was not a minister, and her claim 
was not barred by the ministerial exception.126 
Another example of lower courts not knowing which test should be applied comes from 
the case of Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago127, decided less than a year after Biel. The 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago originally hired Mr. Sterlinski in 1992 as Director of Music.128  
However, in 2014, Mr. Sterlinski was demoted to organist before ultimately being fired in 2015.129  
Mr. Sterlinski sued the Catholic Bishop alleging that his Polish heritage served as the ultimate 
factor in his termination.130 
The case hinged on whether the ministerial exception applied to Mr. Sterlinski.  If the Court 
were to find that Mr. Sterlinski qualified as a minister, his suit would not be able to proceed.  Mr. 
Sterlinski argues that because he “robotically” played the music given to him, he could not qualify 
as a minister under the factors the Court used in Hosanna-Tabor.131 
The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision of the Northern District of Illinois that an organist 
does qualify as a minister under the rationale of Hosanna-Tabor, holding that Mr. Sterlinski’s 
claims fell outside the protections afforded to employees under Title VII.132  The Seventh Circuit 
came to this holding even though the facts of this case were less analogous to Hosanna-Tabor than 
 
125 Id. at 607-10. 
126 Id. at 609-10. 
127 934 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2019). 
128 Id. at 569 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Sterlinski, 934 F.3d at 569. 
132 Id. at 571-72. 
 21 
those present in Biel, such as the fact that Mr. Sterlinski was not ordained and he did not serve as 
a spiritual teacher to the students.133  Although both cases are very similar and the duties of both 
employees would seem to not qualify as ministerial, the two circuits adopted different tests and 
rationale for deciding two similar cases differently.  The Supreme Court will have this opportunity 
through these two cases, as both cases are relied on heavily in the petition for certiorari in the case 
of Our Lady of Guadalupe.134 
Since the Supreme Court decided not to adopt a rigid test, the lower courts are taking every 
opportunity to formulate their own test.  The lack of a uniform test allows the lower courts to create 
factors not mentioned in the Hosanna decision, as well as to stress factors that the Court did not 
make dispositive in that case.  This confusion of which test to apply becomes highlighted when 
analyzing the Biel and Sterlinski decisions.  In Biel, the court adopts the factors that Justice Alito 
proposed in his Hosanna-Tabor concurrence, while the Sterlinski court chooses to ignore these 
factors in favor of a more inclusive view of who qualifies as a minister.  Without uniformity among 
the circuits, there is no protection for religious employers, and the Court can impermissibly 
entangle itself with the internal governance of religious organizations.  Not only will a uniform 
test clarify the scope of the ministerial exception, it will detract from the numerous instances of 
overly-burdensome litigation that often come with these cases.  
IV. The Problem with Contracts 
One of the many problems with the ministerial exception is the question of whether the 
exception should apply to claims of a breach of an employment contract, or whether the exception 
should be limited to claims of employment discrimination.  Currently, the Supreme Court holds 
that the ministerial exception does not apply to claims of breach of an employment contract, and 
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as such, an employee that qualifies as a minister can still bring suit against their employer if they 
can show that the terms of their contract was validated. 
Before the Hosanna-Tabor decision, Courts generally dispensed with the argument that the 
ministerial exception should protect employers.  Prior to 2012, courts generally held that contract 
disputes between religious employers and their employees could not be adjudicated under the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses.   
The Courts continually found that limiting a religious employer’s ability to hire or fire 
employees was a per se violation of the First Amendment.135  This can be seen in the case of Music 
v. United Methodist Church.136  There, an employee of a religious entity filed suit after being fired 
arguing that a contractual relationship existed between himself and the employer.137  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.138  In doing so, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that deciding whether a contractual 
relationship existed would require interpretation of church-made laws, something that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a court from doing.139 
The decision in Hosanna-Tabor created some confusion among the lower courts on this issue.  
It explicitly applied only to anti-discrimination statutes and not to contract disputes.  However, 
after Hosanna-Tabor, some courts continued to protect churches in contract disputes.  For instance, 
in Debruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again found that an 
employee’s claim of breach of an employment contract would force the Court to violate the First 
Amendment, thus making the ministerial exception applicable to these types of cases.140  After 
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Debruin entered into a one-year employment contract with St. Patrick Church (a Catholic Church 
in the Archdiocese of Michigan) his employment was terminated, seemingly in violation of the 
contract.141  The Court found that analyzing these claims, which would require deciding why a 
religious institution hired or fired a ministerial employee, would violate the First Amendment.142  
By holding this, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied the protections afforded to religious 
institutions accused of discrimination under the ministerial exception to claims of a breach of 
contract.  This decision further highlights the confusion that comes with the Supreme Court’s 
decision not to include a bright-line test as to when or to whom the exception applies. 
In contrast of the Debruin decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Kant v. Lexington 
Theological Seminary in 2014.143  After Kant was terminated by the seminary, he filed suit alleging 
that the termination violated his employment contract.144  Adopting the decision in Hosanna-
Tabor, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the ministerial exception did not bar Kant’s claims, 
but even if it did, Kant did not qualify as a minister.145  This decision is contrary to the decision in 
Debruin, further outlining the problems and inconsistencies lower courts have with applying the 
“totality of the circumstances” test introduced by Hosanna-Tabor. 
Failing to formally adopt the ministerial exception to contract disputes raises other issues as 
well.  For example, if the ministerial exception does apply to contract disputes the same as it does 
employment discrimination claims, employees will not benefit from the signing of a contract.  If 
this exception applies, the religious employer would be free to violate any employment contract it 
wished.  As long as the employer could prove that the employee was a minister, which, under the 
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confusing landscape currently adopted following Hosanna-Tabor, is not a difficult burden, the 
employee would not be able to bring a claim to settle a contractual dispute. 
V. Analysis and Conclusions 
It is obvious that the Hosanna-Tabor decision has created confusion among the lower courts.  
This confusion is displayed through inconsistent applications and differing analyses used by the 
lower courts when deciding these types of cases.  Until the Supreme Court creates a bright-line 
test as to when and to whom the ministerial exception applies, this confusion will remain. 
The current “totality of the circumstances” test serves as a good starting point, but a further 
test is needed.  This test should look similar to that proposed in the concurrence by Justice Alito 
(joined by Justice Kagan).  There, Justice Alito proposed the “religious functions test,” asking: (1) 
whether Perich played a substantial role in “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its 
mission;” 2) how often Perich taught the children religion; 3) whether she led the students in daily 
devotional exercises and prayers; and 4) the frequency that she led church-wide worship services) 
should serve as the reasoning for finding Perich to be a minister.146  By incorporating these four 
categories, Justice Alito created a valid bright-line test.  However, he failed to make them more 
generally applicable or define their scope.   
Following the logic that Justice Alito used, the Supreme Court should adopt a “balancing test” 
using the following four factors to determine when one qualifies as a minister: 1) whether the 
employee played a substantial role in furthering the employer’s religious message; 2) how often 
the employee engages in tasks relating to the religious mission of the employer; 3) whether the 
employee held themselves out to be a minister; and 4) whether the employer considered the 
employee to be a minister.  In order to determine whether the employer considered the employee 
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to be a minister, the Court could use a “parallel position” test.  This would ask how a traditional 
clergy member was treated and analyze how similarly the employee in question was treated.147  
For example, in the Catholic faith, the Court would look to if the employee led weekly religious 
services or if the employee ever offered teachings based on scripture. 
Unlike Justice Alito’s concurrence, the Court should stress that although not determinative, the 
third and fourth factor are the most important.  Since the ministerial exception is rooted in the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and aims to avoid the courts getting too involved in the 
decisions of the church, the two most important questions to ask would be if the church considered 
an employee to be in a leadership role, and whether the employee themselves thought of 
themselves to be in that role.   
There is concern over the issues that come with weighing the church’s view of their employees 
so heavily.  For example, if the church wanted to avoid all discrimination suits, it could simply 
hold all employees as ministers.  While this is a legitimate concern, especially when archdioceses 
are beginning to amend their handbooks to make all teachers ministers,148 the importance of the 
other factors, specifically the employee’s own thoughts, balances the test.  Where the Church and 
the employee both believe that the employee is a minister, there can be no doubt that employee 
should be a minister.  However, when there is disagreement about this between the employer and 
employee, then the “totality of the circumstances” as described in Hosanna-Tabor (and in prongs 
1 and 2 of my proposed “balancing test”) become helpful.  These prongs focus on the daily duties 
of the employee as they relate to the church’s religious purpose.  Where an employee spends most 
of their day contributing to the spread of the message of the religious, they should be considered a 
minister.   
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In addition to adopting this test, the Supreme Court should adopt a ruling which states that this 
exception applies to all claims, regardless of whether the claim is based in contract or 
discrimination law.  The purpose of the exception was to keep the Courts from having to get 
involved with the hiring or firing of an employee.  This should not change based on which body 
of law the employee bases their claim in.  Regardless of discrimination or contract, the religious 
institution should hold the power to decide who will be responsible for furthering their religious 
message.  The Supreme Court’s revised test should be applicable to all claims. 
There is obvious concern that adopting a bright-line test will disadvantage non-traditional 
religions.  However, the proposed test is sufficiently general to include all religions, regardless of 
conventionality.  By focusing on how the religious institution and the employee themselves view 
the role of the employee, the Supreme Court would allow for analyzing a non-traditional religion.  
The test does not force the Court to look to if the employee performed the conventional tasks of a 
minister, such as leading religious services or teaching religious classes.  Instead, the proposed test 
allows for a case-by-case analysis, where both sides view of the employee’s duties hold weight.  
This test merges the tests proposed by Justice Thomas and Alito and allows for every relevant 
factor to be examined, without favoring the view of one party over the other. 
By adopting a bright-line test that stresses how the employer and employee viewed the role of 
the employee, the Supreme Court will create uniformity among application by the lower courts.  
No longer will there be differing opinions of who qualifies as a minister based solely off a lower 
court’s reading of a case.  The opportunity to create factors not mentioned in the Hosanna decision 
or to lean heavily on a factor not meant to be dispositive will no longer exist for the lower courts.  
Instead, each jurisdiction in the country will uniformly adopt and apply a single test.  In addition 
to the consistency of lower court decisions, this would allow employers to know who qualifies as 
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a minister.  By doing this, the Supreme Court would allow the religious institutions to focus on 
spreading their message without guessing as to whether a hiring or firing decision will drag them 
into the perils of litigation. 
Given that the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. 
v. Morrissey-Berru149, the answer to the issues raised in this article likely will be answered sooner 
rather than later. 
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